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Abstract—Online communities are more dynamic in terms of 
composition compared to traditional physical communities. 
This can affect the conditions for cooperation. We discuss 
empirical results from online communities and extend the 
evolution of firms model of Axtell to discover the conditions of 
cooperation in groups. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T was just a few decades ago that most people spend most 
of their time in a local community within in physical 
proximity of other community members. Nowadays we 
spend an increasing amount of time online. These online 
activities could relate to social networking, but also creating 
content for encyclopedia (e.g. Wikipedia), software (e.g. 
github), book review (e.g. Amazon), answering questions 
(e.g. stackoverflow).  People can participate in diverse 
communities facilitated by online communication.  
For communities to be productive members need to spend 
effort. For example, farmers in small-scale irrigation 
communities invest time and effort in maintenance of 
common infrastructure, meeting to coordinate the scared 
resource and sharing food in periods in need. Ostrom [1] has 
demonstrated that communities can be very effective in self-
organizing their activities to be productive and avoiding 
overharvesting of the commons. A key factor thought to 
explain this are boundary rules which define entry and exit 
to the communities. 
Online communities are different since boundary rules are 
less strict. People can participate in different communities 
and leave or reduce their effort if the direct benefits are not 
sufficient for the persons involved. This lead communities to 
compete for effort among potential members. The question 
we explore is to understand what the conditions are for 
productivity and long-levity of online communities. 
The importance of this question can be seen by efforts to 
solve collective action problems by online communities such 
as creating encyclopedia (Wikipedia), and open source 
software (Sourceforge), and various sustainability problems 
[2]. But is groups are more fluid, cooperation within a group 
might be less stable. The study on the evolution of 
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cooperation shows that repeated interaction (direct 
reciprocity) and indirected reciprocity (if having reliable 
reputation information) can explain high levels of 
cooperation in human societies. But when group 
composition changes frequently, what are the conditions in 
which cooperative arrangements can persist. 
A relevant model in this context is the study of Axtell on 
firms [3]. Axtell formulate firms by having a population of 
agents where agents have preferences for income and 
leisure, and groups invest effort to the group, the firm, to 
produce output. There are increasing returns to cooperation, 
and agents can benefit from the group efforts since the 
output is divided equally among the participants. Agents 
define their effort level to maximize their utility. As a 
consequence agents may free ride on the investments of 
others. Agents are permitted to join other firms or start up 
new firms when it is welfare-improving to do so. As a firm 
becomes large, agents have little incentive to supply effort, 
since each agent’s share is relatively insensitive to its effort 
level. This gives rise to free riders. As free riding becomes 
commonplace in a group, agents will leave. Hence firms 
change in size all the time, but the distribution of firm sizes 
is a stable Zip distribution similar to the empirical data [4]. 
 We have replicated the Axtell model in Netlogo and will 
adjust it to explain observations in online communities. 
Let’s first show some of the findings from online 
communities, and then we will discuss how we will change 
the Axtell model. 
 
 
II. PATTERNS IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES 
The data investigated in the current study are the log files of 
Baidu Tieba system, a collection of many topic-specific 
forums. Please refer to 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baidu_Tieba for a more 
comprehensive introduction of this system. Among the 
millions of forums in the system, we select the top 1,000 
forums, whose size (the average daily page views in two 
months) varies from hundreds to millions. For each forum, 
we recorded the hourly number of unique visitors and total 
clicks in 58 days from Feb. 28, 2013 to Apr. 27, 2013. 
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 We find that the two rules suggested in the model of 
Malcai et al. [5] , i.e., the converged power-law distribution 
of organization size and the symmetric levy-stable 
distribution of the growth rate of average size in time, also 
shape the growth of online communities. Different from 
previous studies on organization evolution which usually 
focus on the dynamics of only one variable [4, 6, 7], we 
analyze both of the size (visitors) and productivity (clicks) 
of online communities. The richness of data allows us to 
explore the relationship between two variables in time, and 
we observe the super-linear scaling relationship of 
productivity vs. size, quantifying the economics of scales in 
collective action online. We also find that the scaling 
exponent is not universal, but decreases gradually to unity 
with the growth of community size, indicating the limits of 
the economics of scales. This pattern calls for a more 
comprehensive model than Malcai's on the growth dynamics 
of online communities.  
We analyze the hourly-based distributions of the top 1,000 
forums in terms of visitors and clicks, and find that the 
shape of the distributions do not change in time, as given in 
Figure 1. Both of the number of visitors and clicks satisfy 
power-law distribution, where the scaling exponents of the 
power-law distributions of visitors and clicks are 1:33 and 
1:11, respectively. 
We also looked at the distribution of effort among 
different communities, and find that 30% of the members 
participate in more than one forum during a day (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The hourly-based distributions of community size and 
productivity. (A) and (B) give the hourly distribution of visitors and clicks, 
respectively. The distributions were plotted in rank-order curves, in which y 
axis shows values and x axis shows the decreasing rank of the values. The 
color of data points change from blue to green gradually as time passes. We 
fitted the scaling exponents in every hour using ordinary least square 
regression in log-log axes and calculated the average value. We plotted the 
fitted line in red dotted line and denoted the value of the exponent in the 
lower left of (A) and (B). 
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Figure 2. Distribution of daily clicks (left) and visited forums at individual 
level (right). The data contains the record of 16+ million active users. The 
results show that a user may visit many different forums in a day. The 430 
forums as a separation between human and robot corresponds to the 
threshold of 1000 thread views/clicks per day, which is an arbitrary 
threshold to detect a robot.  
 
III. EXTENSIONS 
By September we expect to have done a more thorough 
empirical analysis of dynamics of online communities. For 
example, we like to explore the logs of stack overflow and 
identify population and effort levels of different topics and 
communities. In this extended abstract we use a simplistic 
number of clicks as effort. With stack overflow data we can 
measure effort based on feedback participants get on the 
quality of their work and the reputation they receive within 
the community. 
 We will extend the Axtell model by allowing agents to 
spend effort in more than one group, allow agents to have 
evolving social networks and allow agents to have 
preferences that affect which groups they move to. In the 
current Axtell model agents can move to groups that are 
known within their social network. There are no entree rules 
and we like to explore the effect of including entree rules 
(such having a minimum reputation level) on the population 
dynamics. 
 In the analysis we will explore the effect of increased 
mobility of the population on the ability to create 
cooperation. Janssen and Goldstone [8] showed that with 
traditional public good games this only happens with small 
levels of mobility. Since we observe cooperation in online 
communities with high levels of mobility, we will explore 
mobility rules, exit and entry rules, and reputation scores, to 
detect conditions for cooperation. 
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